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INTRODUCTION
Recent school finance litigation illustrates yet again how law can
generate unintended policy consequences. Seeking to improve student
achievement and school accountability, more states now turn to educa-
tional standards and assessments. However, courts increasingly allow
litigants and lawsuits to transform standards and assessments into consti-
tutional entitlements to additional resources. Thus, increased legal and
financial exposure for school districts follows from the implementation
t Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. I am grateful to Dawn Chutkow
and the participants at faculty workshops at Boston College and Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity law schools and the Children and Education: Tensions Within the Parent-Child-State
Triad Symposium at Cornell Law School. Thanks as well to Daniel Fishbein, David Fried-
man, and the librarians at Case Western Reserve University for excellent research assistance.
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of what many consider a plausible educational policy. The judiciary's
participation in this development uncovers old and new problems that
arise when courts are asked to set educational policy.
In this instance, the unintended consequences flow from an interac-
tion between two distinct but increasingly related factors: educational
standards and school finance litigation. States' development and imple-
mentation of educational standards and assessments flow from the educa-
tional excellence movement and rank among the more significant
educational policy developments during the past few decades. These
programs typically articulate goals and measure progress by students and
schools toward those goals.' The second factor, school finance litigation,
reflects a multi-decade effort to use the courts to secure additional fund-
ing for public schools from state legislatures.2 This litigation is fre-
quently nested in a broader push for greater equality of opportunity for a
state's poor and minority schoolchildren. The transition of school fi-
nance litigation from an equity to an adequacy mooring, initiated in
1989, 3 facilitated an interaction with standards and assessments policy.
Recently, educational standards and school finance litigation con-
verged in a way that enables school districts to gain financially from their
inability to meet desired achievement levels. These failures are used in
court to bolster legal claims that such schools underachieve because their
resources are inadequate and, therefore, unconstitutional. Thus, paradox-
ically, litigants transform failure in the classroom into success in the
courtroom. Those who join the effort to link standards and school fi-
nance lawsuits typically include teachers' unions, education profession-
als, and public school districts, as well as others with a vested stake in
preserving - indeed, enhancing - the educational status quo, especially
those who desire and stand to gain from additional educational resources.
Their efforts reveal organized interests' honed ability to adapt to an ever-
changing policy milieu.
Efforts to transform educational standards and assessments into le-
gal entitlements for enhanced funding through the judiciary raise impor-
tant legal and policy questions. Courts' institutional limitations
hamstring their ability to formulate and implement educational policy.
Public and private attention to lawyers and lawsuits often deflects school
administrators' resources and focus from more pressing challenges, such
as improving student achievement and addressing structural impediments
I See Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, The Confusing World of Educational
Accountability, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 365 (1995).
2 See, e.g., Ala. Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala. 1993); Sheff v.
O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994); DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E.2d 733
(Ohio 1997).
3 See infra Subpart II.C.
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to educational reform. The weight of these unanticipated costs is borne
largely by schoolchildren and, consequently, our nation.
I begin in Part I by describing recent litigation in two states, New
York and North Carolina, that illustrates my central contention: Courts
increasingly converge educational standards and school finance litiga-
tion. Part II explores the two main components of this emerging trend in
greater detail, as well as how these trends interact. Part III considers the
consequences of this interaction. I conclude with a note of caution that
flows largely from the institutional stress that emerges from judicial in-
volvement in the development of education policy in this manner.
I. AN EMERGING TREND
Unlike the federal Constitution,4 every state constitution directly ad-
dresses education, though in varying degrees.5 State constitutional com-
mands range from a "general and uniform" 6 to a "thorough and
efficient"7 education.8 Through education clauses, states assign them-
selves the obligation of educating students and, to a lesser extent, articu-
late the level of a state's obligation.
4 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.
Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.").
5 See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VH, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IND. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2D, § 3; KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MASS.
CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § I; Miss.
CONST. art. VIII, § 20 1; Mo. CONST. art. IX, § I(A); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 1; NEv. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; N.J. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4, 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CoNrsT. art. IX, § 2; N.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § I; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art.
VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; Tax. CONST. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art.
X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1; W. VA.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WiS. CONST. art. X, § 3; WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
6 MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
7 N.J. CONST. art VIII, § 4, 1.
8 William E. Thro places state constitutions into three categories. William E. Thro, A
New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL.
525, 53-40 (1998). Some state constitutions have only "establishment provisions" and only
create a public school system (e.g., Alabama). Id. at 539. Other constitutions have "quality
provisions" and mandate some specific quality (e.g., Arkansas). Id. In the last category, "high
duty provisions" place education high on a state's priority list (e.g., Georgia). Id. at 539-40.
For an alternate evaluation of state constitutional provisions, see Robert M. Jensen, Advancing
Education Through the Education Clauses of State Constitutions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. l,
3-8 (organizing state education clauses in terms of the textual commitment to education as
well as by degree of specificity).
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Historically, most state courts declined requests by litigants to trans-
late these education clauses into specific educational policies or spending
mandates. In the past, courts typically noted the clauses' vagueness and,
in any event, the absence of traditional judicial tools to develop them.9
Consequently, prior to the 1970s, state courts generally displayed greater
levels of institutional modesty and deference to their legislative and ex-
ecutive counterparts as well as to political processes aimed at developing
and implementing educational policies.
Beginning in the 1970s, this judicial modesty and reluctance waned,
and some - but not all - states' courts ventured into the educational
policymaking terrain through school finance lawsuits.10 Following a
path cleared by increasingly active federal courts, litigants in state courts
began pushing judges into cases with broad public policy and budgetary
ramifications. Some state judges welcomed litigants' push and perceived
their judicial authority in broader, more expansive terms."
More recently, litigants have forged a nascent trend of combining
educational standards and assessments with school finance adequacy liti-
gation. This trend will accelerate and steepen the courts' trajectory into
educational policymaking. Court decisions in two states - New York
and North Carolina - illustrate this trend and hint at its potential con-
tours and impact.
A. NEW YORK
New York's constitution guarantees its citizens a "sound basic edu-
cation."' 2 New York's Board of Regents - the body charged with
broad, statewide education policymaking authority - is among those re-
sponsible for translating the state constitutional command into concrete
education policies. Not surprisingly, the board's policymaking activities
have included consideration of standards and assessments. After more
than a decade of development and debate, New York adopted the Re-
9 See, e.g., Robinson v. Schenck, I N.E. 698 (Ind. 1885) (discussing how lawmakers
and not courts should assess what constitutes a general and uniform public school system).
10 See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 432, 448-54 (1999).
1 1 For discussion about some state courts' more activist postures, see, e.g., John B. Wef-
ing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of Independence and Activism, 29
RUTGERS L.J. 701, 702 (1998) ("The New Jersey Supreme Court's reputation is based on a
long history of activist decisions"); Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism Pendulum, 98 W. VA.
L. REV. 771, 785 (1996) (discussing how state courts are perceived as more hospitable than
federal courts for those who seek "expanded protection of human rights and civil liberties").
12 New York's constitution states, "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be
educated." N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. New York's Court of Appeals has interpreted the term
"education ... to connote a sound basic education." Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
369 (N.Y. 1982).
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gents Learning Standards in 1996.13 The standards articulate expecta-
tions at three educational stages (elementary, intermediate, and high
school graduation 14) in such core subjects as English, math, and sci-
ence. 15 New York's standards align with the state's Regents Exams 16
that, for many students throughout New York, especially the college-
bound, have become a familiar rite of passage. At present, successful
performance on the Regents Exams is necessary to earn a Regents Di-
ploma. By 2004, however, successful performance will be required to
receive a standard high school diploma in New York. 17
Unlike most of its urban counterparts, per-pupil spending in New
York City's public schools ($9,623 in 1998-99) falls just below the
state's average ($10,317 in 1998-99)."' Frustrated with unsuccessful ap-
peals to lawmakers for increased resources, New York City turned to the
courts. 19 In the most recent round of school finance litigation, the plain-
tiffs - students, parents, and organizations concerned with New York
City public schools - sought assistance from the courts to gain for city
schools an increased share of the state's educational spending. Litigants
argued that the application of the state funding formula denied city
schoolchildren the opportunity to receive a sound and basic education. 20
More specifically, the plaintiffs sought increased state assistance to en-
hance numerous aspects of its schools, including class size and teacher
quality.21
In defending its school finance system, the state argued that educa-
tional spending in New York City as well as its share from the state were
"adequate" and met constitutional requirements. Implicit in the state's
argument was that the constitutional command for educational "ade-
quacy" requires only that the state lift all students to a minimal floor.
13 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001),
rev'd, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
14 Id. at 484.
15 Id. at 483 n.7.
16 Id. at 516.
17 C. Cora True-Frost, Beyond Levittown Towards a Quality Education for All Children:
Litigating High Minimum Standards for Public Education. The CFE Case, 51 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1015, 1040 n.170 (2001).
18 See CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, THE STATE OF LEARNING IN NY: THE STATE OF
LEARNING IN NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, available at http://www.cfequity.org/ns-sta-
2.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2002) (citing NEW YORK: THE STATE OF LEARNING (June 2001), a
report from the Regents and Education Department to the governor and legislature). It is
worth noting that the source of these figures is a party to the ongoing school finance litigation
in New York. The figures themselves, however, are a matter of public record.
19 For a helpful description of the protracted school finance litigation in New York, see
Leon D. Lazer, New York Public School Financing Litigation, 14 TOURo L. REv. 675, 682-91
(1998).
20 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 529-34.
21 Id. at 550. By seeking a greater share of the state educational spending pie, the plain-
tiffs advanced New York City's interests as well.
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From the state's perspective, this "floor" meant that it must equip stu-
dents only with the basic tools necessary for active, productive
citizenship. 22
New York City construed educational adequacy differently and
drew on the state's own Regents Learning Standards to help define it.23
To bolster their argument for additional court-ordered resources, the
plaintiffs cited the failure of many city students to pass the state's Re-
gents Exams and earn Regents Diplomas. In 2000, for example, only
27% of New York City high school graduates earned Regents Diplomas;
49% did so in the rest of the state. 24 New York City's claim pivots partly
on the assumption that adequate funding is the amount necessary to en-
sure that New York City's students meet the state's Regents Learning
Standards at a level comparable with their counterparts in the rest of the
state.2
5
At trial, the New York court in Manhattan agreed with much of the
plaintiffs' argument and concluded that city students were not receiving a
sound, adequate education. 26 The court pointed to the quality of the
city's public school teaching force, surging class sizes, wanting curricu-
lum, and dilapidated infrastructure as factors contributing to the city's
woeful student achievement scores.27 The logic of the trial court's opin-
ion pivots on student achievement, especially the Regents Learning Stan-
dards. Paradoxically, city students' absolute and relative failure to earn
Regents Diplomas proved critical to the city's success in the courtroom.
As a remedy, the court ordered the state to reform its school funding
system.
An appeals court reversed the trial court, agreeing with the state's
interpretation of what the New York constitution requires in terms of
educational services. 28 The appeals court concluded that the state's
"sound basic education" standard requires that the state provide a "mini-
mally adequate educational opportunity" rather than a guarantee for a
higher entitlement, however laudable and attractive such a guarantee
might be from a policy perspective.29 The level of education owed New
York's students includes those "skills necessary to obtain employment,
and to discharge one's civic responsibilities. '30 Moreover, the appeals
court discounted - but did not dismiss - the plaintiffs' efforts to lever-
22 Id. at 483-84.
23 Id.
24 See CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITy, supra note 18.
25 Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
26 Id. at 549.
27 Id. at 498-516.
28 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
29 Id. at 134.
30 Id. at 138.
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age city students' low achievement scores as a basis for an educational
inadequacy claim. The appeals court noted that student achievement
data, while "helpful," should be interpreted "cautiously" due to the myr-
iad other variables that influence student achievement. 3' The plaintiffs
have already promised an appeal to New York's highest court. A deci-
sion on their appeal is expected in 2003.
Although the success of the plaintiffs' effort to leverage standards
and assessments into increased educational funding in New York has not
been finally decided, two reasons underscore the importance of the plain-
tiffs' effort regardless of the outcome. First, it is possible that New
York's highest court could reverse the appeals court and reinstate the
trial court's interpretation of the state's education clause. Second, even
if the appeals court decision stands, the success (however temporary) of
the plaintiffs' argument at the trial court will encourage litigants in others
states to pursue similar litigation.
B. NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina's constitution requires that the state provide a "gen-
eral and uniform" educational system. 32 To discharge this constitutional
obligation, North Carolina lawmakers rewrote the state's Basic Educa-
tion Program in 1985. 33 Shortly afterward, the state board of education
developed a Standard Course of Study designed to help all North Caro-
lina students navigate successfully as adults and citizens. North Carolina
lawmakers also implemented end-of-grade and end-of-course exams that
chart student progress toward mastering the state's academic goals 34 and
help increase school accountability. 35 High school graduates in North
Carolina must also pass the North Carolina High School Competency
test, which is currently set at approximately the eighth-grade level of
skills mastery. 36
In 1994, both low- and high-spending public school districts chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the state's school finance system.37 All of
31 Id. at 135.
32 N.C. 'CONST. art. IX, § 2. North Carolina's constitution also requires, in part, that
"equal opportunities shall be provided for all students." Id.
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (2000).
34 Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 2000 WL 1639686, at *10 (N.C. Super. Oct. 12,
2000).
35 Id. at *68.
36 Id. at *77.
37 See generally id. The original action brought in 1994 was filed by plaintiffs from
North Carolina's poorer, rural districts. After the action was filed, additional plaintiffs from
relatively wealthy, urban systems were permitted to intervene. Id. at *1. Thus, this litigation
brought together high-spending districts (such as Charlotte-Mecklenberg, whose per pupil
spending exceeded the state mean) and low-spending districts (such as Hoke County, whose
per pupil spending fell below the state mean).
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the plaintiff districts wanted greater resources, but they advanced differ-
ent reasons. The low-spending (largely rural) districts wanted more
funding to close the resource gap between low- and high-spending school
districts. In contrast, high-spending districts, principally located in urban
areas, argued for increased funding to offset the peculiar challenges
posed by city life.38
In a 1997 decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
various procedural issues related to a lawsuit challenging the state's
school funding system. 39 While careful to avoid deciding the underlying
substantive claims, the court held that, in construing whether a sound and
basic education was being provided, courts could properly consider re-
sults from student assessments.40 Following the supreme court's gui-
dance, a North Carolina trial court recently decided to prompt a
restructuring of the state's pre-kindergarten educational system. 41 That
court, noting a wide gap between the performance of at-risk and not-at-
risk students on statewide assessments, concluded that greater attention
to the special needs of at-risk students was constitutionally required.42
Similar to its counterpart in New York, the North Carolina trial court
implicitly assumed that greater resources would close student achieve-
ment gaps. Another aspect that tethers the recent New York and North
Carolina cases is the key role in the litigation played by results from
high-stakes testing.
38 Cost structure is among the peculiar challenges for school systems in major urban
areas. Specifically, the cost of living is simply higher in most urban areas. Moreover, the cost
of developing and delivering educational services to inner-city children - a disproportionate
number of whom are from low-income homes and require special or supplemental services -
is usually higher. For a general discussion, see ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS,
SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 208-41 (1992) (discussing formula adjustments for
student needs, education level, scale economies, and price). See also Thomas A. Downes &
Thomas F. Pogue, Adjusting School Aid Formulas for the Higher Cost of Educating Disadvan-
taged Students, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 89 (1994). Adjusting school funding for cost structure con-
siderations in school finance formulas can be traced to the seminal work of PAUL R. MORT,
THE MEASUREMENT OF EDUCATIONAL NEED (1924) (advancing a technique for deriving a mea-
sure of the educational need as a basis for the distribution of state aid to local school districts).
39 The state's motion to dismiss was denied at trial. See Hoke County, 2000 WL
1639686, at *2. The state appealed and prevailed at the appeals court. Leandro v. State, 468
S.E.2d 543 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). The plaintiffs then appealed to the North Carolina Supreme
Court and prevailed. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). For a review of the
procedural history, see Hoke County, 2000 WL 1639686, at *2-6.
40 Hoke County, 2000 WL 1639686, at *5 (noting that the "level of performance of the
children on standardized achievement tests" could be considered by the courts).
41 Id. at *113.
42 For purposes of its decision, the court construed at-risk students to include "low-in-
come" as well as "low-performing" students. Id. at *50. Later in its opinion, the court defined
the term "at-risk students" more concretely (noting that at-risk students are those who, for
example, may be disruptive, violent, from low-income or low-socioeconomic homes, or from
homes where the father is absent). Id. at *92.
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Perhaps mindful of the magnitude of the burden its decision placed
on the legislative and executive branches, the North Carolina court com-
manded lawmakers to change the state funding formula "at a reasoned
and deliberate pace."'43 While the court's language was no doubt in-
tended to allay fears about judicial over-reaching (real or perceived), the
obvious reference to the Brown v. Board of Education II opinion (com-
manding desegregation with "all deliberate speed" a ) may have achieved
the opposite effect. 45
Individually, the lawsuits in New York and North Carolina carve
new legal terrain in how they leverage policy in the courtroom.46 Even if
the appeals court decision in New York withstands review, the trial court
decision will remain influential, as it will likely serve as a roadmap for
other litigants in other states. Taken together, the New York and North
Carolina cases illustrate a new trend in school finance litigation.
Whether this trend will grow is unclear, but two factors enhance the pos-
sibility. First, while important variations exist, all state constitutions say
something about education.47 Second, most states continue to develop
and implement education standards, assessments, and results-based ac-
countability programs. Indeed, President George W. Bush's federal edu-
cation initiative,48 which features standards and high-stakes testing
components, is designed to accelerate this state activity. To be sure, it is
far from clear whether courts in other states might follow New York and
North Carolina's lead and draw on standards and assessments policies as
evidence of constitutionally inadequate education. What is clear, how-
ever, is that such a trail has been blazed.
II. HOW THESE UNINTENDED POLICY
CONSEQUENCES AROSE
Real or perceived failure of existing education policy typically
ignites efforts to develop and implement reforms. The condition of
American education continues to worry many people, especially parents
of school-age children. Perhaps even more alarming is the likelihood
43 Id. at *114.
44 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11).
45 One consequence was that North Carolina Gov. Michael Easley recently established a
task force to study the state's education system and develop a long-range plan to improve the
public schools. As a consequence, the North Carolina Supreme Court, on its own motion
pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b), amended its earlier order and vacated only that portion
directing the state to conduct a statewide self-study of the educational system. Hoke County
Bd. of Educ. v. State, Order of May 29, 2001 (N.C. Super. Ct.), available at http://www.nc
forum.org/pdf/52901_order.pdf.
46 For a prediction of this development, see Michael Heise, The Courts vs. Educational
Standards, 120 PUB. INT. 55 (1995).
47 See supra note 5.
48 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
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that American elementary and secondary school student academic
achievement will remain stubbornly mediocre and immune to reform ef-
forts, especially those that involve increasing resources. 49
A. STAGNANT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
Leading educational indicators indicate a decline during the past
several decades.50 The average verbal and math SAT scores declined
more than fifty points and almost forty points, respectively, between
1963 and 1980.51 Despite slight occasional increases during the mid-
1980s, the overall downward trend in SAT scores persisted through
1991.52 Performance of American students also fell in comparison with
their foreign counterparts. 53 In a 1990 assessment of student achieve-
ment involving fifteen industrialized nations, American thirteen-year-
olds ranked thirteenth in mathematics and science. 54 A Congressional
Budget Office survey summarized related data and concluded:
The existence of a sizable drop in test scores during the
1960s and 1970s has been well known for some time.
The decline was remarkably pervasive affecting many
different types of students in most grades, in all regions
of the United States, in Catholic as well as public
schools and even Canadian schools. The drop was ap-
parent in the results of different kinds of tests covering
many subject areas. 55
Many scholars echo the similar message that "during the past three
decades student achievement has, at best, stayed constant and may have
49 See, e.g., Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporations in Revitalizing Pub-
lic Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 883, 886-87 (1993); DAVID
W. GRISSMER ET AL., STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT AND THE CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY 3, 16
(1994); NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 8 (1983) [hereinafter NATION AT RISK]; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INTER-
NATIONAL EDUCATION COMPARISONS 7, 22 (1992); ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING
SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS XViii (1994).
50 Solomon, supra note 49, at 886.
51 NATION AT RISK, supra note 49, at 8-9 (examining the quality of education in the
United States and offering practical recommendations for reform and improvement).
52 Charles Murray & R.J. Hernstein, What's Really Behind the SAT-Score Decline?, 106
PUB. INT. 32, 33 fig. I (1992). But see David W. Grissmer, The Continuing Use and Misuse of
SAT Scores, 6 J. PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & LAW 223, 224-26 (2000) (arguing that the expanded
pool of SAT test-takers explains much of the SAT score decline over the past decades).
53 Solomon, supra note 49, at 886; NATION AT RISK, supra note 49, at 8. See generally
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 49.
54 Solomon, supra note 49, at 886.
55 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT: EXPLANATIONS AND IMPLICA-
TIONS OF RECENT TRENDS (1987), quoted in Sam Peltzman, The Political Economy of the
Decline of American Public Education, 36 J.L. & EcON. 331, 333 (1993).
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fallen."' 56 Even the more sanguine note that optimistic interpretations of
achievement data underscore problems. If the performance of American
students has remained constant over time in absolute terms, it has fallen
in relative terms due to improved performances of many foreign stu-
dents. 57 Concurrently, the demands of the workplace increase. 58 Levels
of achievement and mastery of skills that might have sufficed a genera-
tion ago no longer appear adequate. 59
To be sure, not all agree that American student academic achieve-
ment has slipped over the years. Given its complexity, it is not surpris-
ing to find discord on the issue of whether achievement levels have
declined over time, as conventional wisdom suggests. 60 A recent RAND
Corporation report 61 as well as a book by professors David Berlinger and
Bruce Biddle62 present a dissenting viewpoint and argue that American
student academic achievement has not declined during the past few de-
cades. 63 However, even if one accepts questions about the precise mag-
nitude of the crisis confronting American student performance generally,
markedly few serious scholars dissent from the proposition that many
urban public schools confront substantial challenges in their efforts to
serve their students, many of whom are members of minority groups or
come from low-income households or both. 64
High-poverty schools, especially high-poverty urban schools, al-
most always have lower levels of academic achievement than do low-
poverty schools. Studies reaching this conclusion abound. A 1997 lon-
gitudinal study of 40,000 students, for example, concluded that "the pov-
56 HANUSHEK, supra note 49, at xviii.
57 Id.
58 See generally RAY MARSHALL & MARC TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING: EDUCATION
AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1992); NAT'L CriR. ON EDUC. AND THE ECON., AMERICA'S
CHOICE: HIGH SKILLS OR Low WAGES! (1990).
59 Indeed, lingering concern over the competitiveness of the American workforce has
generated recent calls for legislation. See, e.g., Joint Approach to Raising Skills of Workforce
Sought, 140 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 116 (May 25, 1992) (discussing labor union officials'
support for incentives for increased worker training as well as union support for the High
Skills Competitive Workforce Act of 1991, S. 1790, 102d Cong.) (1991) (the House and Sen-
ate both held hearings on the bill but never brought it to a vote on the floor).
60 See, e.g., GRiSSMER, supra note 49, at xvii, 3, 16 (1994).
61 See id. at 16.
62 DAVID C. BERLINGER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS (1995).
63 The Berlinger and Biddle thesis has not been widely accepted. For a recent discussion
about the nature and extent of the decline in American educational performance, see David W.
Murray, Waiting for Utopia, 2 EDUC. NEXT 73, 74-75 (2002) (discussing the weight of evi-
dence rebutting the Berlinger and Biddle thesis), available at http://www.educationnext.org/
20022/73.html.
64 In 1988, forty-seven of the nation's largest urban public school systems enrolled more
than 37% and 31% of the nation's black and Hispanic schoolchildren, respectively. See COUN-
CIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., NATIONAL URBAN EDUCATION GOALS: BASELINE INDICATORS,
1990-91, at 9-10 figs.9 & 11 (1992).
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erty level of the school (over and above the economic status of an
individual student) is negatively related to standardized achievement
scores." 65 This study confirmed that "the poverty level of certain schools
places disadvantaged children in double jeopardy. School poverty de-
presses the scores of all students in a school where at least half the stu-
dents are eligible for subsidized lunch[ ] and seriously depresses the
scores when over 75% of students live in low-income households. '66 A
similar study conducted in 1993 found that students in low-poverty
schools typically score 50% to 75% higher on reading and math tests
than students in high-poverty schools. 67
In addition to depressing achievement, attending a high-poverty
school also adversely affects academic attainment. Students attending
high-poverty schools are more likely to drop out than students attending
low-poverty schools. 68 This partly explains why dropout rates remain
alarmingly high in many cities. The average dropout rate in 1990 in the
nation's forty-seven largest school districts was more than twice the na-
tional average of 12.1%.69 In some individual districts, the dropout rates
astonish. In 1998, for example, the overall dropout rate in Cleveland was
72%; in both Memphis and Milwaukee it exceeded 56%.70 Moreover,
additional problems persist for those students who remain in high-pov-
erty, urban schools. Urban teachers report spending more time on class-
room order and discipline than their non-urban counterparts, 71 as well as
more problems relating to student absenteeism,72 pregnancy, 73 and weap-
ons possession.74 Finally, those who manage to graduate from high-pov-
erty, urban schools are less likely to attend college than those who
graduate from low-poverty schools. 75
65 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., PROSPECTS: FINAL REPORT ON STUDENT OUTCOMES 73 (1997).
66 Id. at 12.
67 MICHAEL J. DUMA ET AL., PROSPECTS: THE CONGRESSIONALLY MANDATED STUDY OF
EDUCATIONAL GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY - INTERIM REPORT 44 (1993).
68 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 54 (2001).
69 Compare COUNCIL OF THE GREAT CITY SCH., supra note 64, at xvi (urban school
data), with NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2000,
tbl.107 (national data), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs200l/digest/dtl07.html (Dec.
2000).
70 See JAY P. GREENE, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION RATES IN
THE UNITED STATES (2001). Greene's definition of dropout is fairly expansive and includes
some students who are typically left out of dropout calculations, such as students who dropped
out but later earned a GED.
71 LAURA LIPPMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGES OF
LOCATION AND POVERTY 116 (1996).
72 Id. at 114 figs.4.41 & 4.42.
73 Id. at 124 figs.4.56 & 4.57.
74 Id. at 120 figs.4.50 & 4.51.
75 KAHLENBERG, supra note 68, at 54 ("Few students graduating from high-poverty high
schools are likely to be going on to college: just 15% of inner-city graduates do").
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Persistent and nagging gaps between minority and non-minority stu-
dent achievement also trouble observers. Based on her review of Na-
tional Assessment of Educational Progress data, Professor Diane Ravitch
concludes that while minority students have made progress in closing the
achievement gap, significant statistical differences endure. 76 Due largely
to the particular challenges that confront many urban school districts as
well as lingering student achievement gaps, school reform advocates now
focus increasing attention on approaching the reform of urban public
schools in a distinct manner. That urban school systems might receive
particular emphasis or heightened scrutiny from reformers demonstrates
the magnitude and distinctiveness of the challenges now facing many
urban school systems. 77
Understandable concerns about American schools and student aca-
demic performance persist. Two separate policy initiatives seek to ad-
dress some of these concerns: (1) educational standards and assessments
and (2) school finance litigation.
B. STANDARDS AND ASSESSMENTS
For years, and particularly since the 1980s, educational reformers
pushed the development and implementation of academic standards as
well as assessment instruments designed to gauge progress toward those
standards. 78 This approach reflects the belief that what matters most is
whether children are learning and that this can only be assured if regular
assessments are administered to measure progress toward clear perform-
ance standards. Proponents of standards and assessments justified them
partly as a way to increase student achievement and school
accountability. 79
States' embrace of the standards and assessments movement can be
partly attributed to increased bipartisan federal political activity. A
movement for national education goals was launched by President
George Bush and his hosting of the nation's first education summit in
76 DIANE RAVITCH, NATIONAL STANDARDS IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 72 (1995). See
also Anemona Hartocollis, Analysis Finds Race Disparity in School Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2002, at A24 (discussing gaps in student' achievement between white and non-white stu-
dents in New York); John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Effective Schools and Equal Opportu-
nity, in PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE SCHOOLS 161-83 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989).
77 For an example focusing on education reform in urban schools, see NEW SCHOOLS FOR
A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P. Viteritti
eds., 1997).
78 For a helpful summary of the social history of the standards and assessment move-
ment, see generally DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BEHIND: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL REFORMS
(2000); CHESTER E. FINN JR., WE MUST TAKE CHARGE: OUR SCHOOLS AND OUR FUTURE
(1991).
79 See id.
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1989.80 President Bill Clinton's administration followed through legisla-
tively on a modified version of the Bush initiative. 81 Finally, recent leg-
islation signed into law by President George W. Bush deploys new
federal funds to help entice states to develop new or enhance existing
educational standards and assessments regimes. 82 In the past decade,
forty-nine states have implemented (or enhanced) some form of educa-
tional standards and assessments program.83 Not surprisingly, the qual-
ity of these programs varies, sometimes tremendously. 84 Moreover, their
efficacy as a policy designed to assist students and schools remains the
subject of debate.85
As standards developed and implementation plans progressed, pol-
icy discussions about accountability and consequences have become
more animated and focused. 86 More states link test results to high-stakes
consequences, including New York and North Carolina. At the institu-
tional level, schools or districts in some states risk a state takeover for
consistently unsatisfactory performance. 87 At the student level, students
80 The education summit produced a report: THE NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL GOALS: A
REPORT TO THE NATION'S GOVERNORS (1990). See also H.R. REP. No. 103-168 (1994), re-
printed in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 63.
81 Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1999) (codi-
fied in part at 20 U.S.C. § 5801). See also William Celis III, New Education Legislation
Defines Federal Role in Nation's Classrooms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994, at B10.
82 See The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002).
83 Iowa is the exception. See ROBERT L. LINN, THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF EDU-
CATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 1 (April 2001) (noting that Iowa, al-
though it has not adopted new content standards, has "a long tradition of testing"), available at
http://cresst96.cse.ucla.edu/CRESST/pages/reports/TR539.pdf. See also, e.g., N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGs. tit. 8, §§ 100.3(b)(2), 100.5(a)(4) (2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81
(2002).
84 THE STATE OF STATE STANDARDS 2000 (Chester E. Finn, Jr. & Michael J. Petrilli eds.,
2000), at http://www.edexcellence.netlibrary/soss2000/Standards2000.pdf; MARGARET E.
GOERTZ ET AL., CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION, ASSESSMENT AND AC-
COUNTABILITY SYSTEMS IN THE 50 STATES, 1999-2000 (2001), available at http://www.cpre.
org/Publications/rr46.pdf. Sometimes, standards are set too low. See MARK D. MUSICK, SET-
TING EDUCATION STANDARDS HIGH ENOUGH, at http://www.sreb.org/main/highschools/ac-
countability/settingstandardshigh.asp (2000).
85 See, e.g., Position Statement of the American Educational Research Association Con-
cerning High-Stakes Testing in Pre K-12 Education, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Nov. 2000, at
24-25, available at http://www.aera.net/pubs/er/pdf/vol29_08/AERA290807.pdf; Robert
Hauser et al., Initial Responses to AERA's Position Statement Concerning High-Stakes Test-
ing, EDUC. RESEARCHER, Nov. 2000, at 27-29, available at http://www.aera.net/pubs/er/pdf/
vo129_08/AERA290808.pdf.; William A. Mehrens, Consequences of Assessment: What is the
Evidence?, 6 EDUC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 13 (July 14, 1998), at http://epaa.asu.edu/
epaa/v6nl3.html.
86 LINN, supra note 83, at 3-6; Ulrich Boser, Pressure Without Support, EDUC. WEEK,
Jan. 2001, at 68, available at http://www.edweek.org/sreports/qc0l/articles/qcOlstory.cfm?
slug=] 7policy.h20.
87 For example, New Jersey gives the state education agency the power to take over a
school district that is performing poorly in terms of student achievement. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
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who do not achieve a certain mastery of core academic subjects are not
promoted or graduated, or they receive a "certificate of attendance"
rather than a full academic diploma. 88
Most observers assumed that lawsuits would quickly follow in
states where standards and assessments triggered palpable consequences
for students and schools. While fears of litigation from disappointed
schools and students are not misplaced, 89 careful planning by policymak-
ers, attention to policy implementation details, focused deployment of
additional resources, student preparation, remediation, and an almost un-
limited supply of second chances for students substantially reduced the
number of lawsuits challenging the legality of high-stakes standards and
assessments. 90
Not surprisingly, many in the educational establishment strongly -re-
sisted standards and assessments policies until resistance became too
awkward and have now resigned themselves to a world that includes
standards and tests. 91 As their policy world shifted beneath them, many
in the schools' establishment set out to make the best of an uncomforta-
ble situation by joining the standards and assessments programs with
evolving school finance theory.
C. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION: THE EMERGENCE OF ADEQUACY
As the standards movement unfolded, school finance litigation
changed in a fundamental way. That change involved the replacement of
equity with adequacy as the theoretical basis for school finance lawsuits.
School finance lawsuits advancing an equity theory sought to close
gaps in spending between low- and high-spending districts and domi-
nated the education landscape during the 1970s and 1980s. Most fa-
mously, the Serrano92 litigation in California articulated school finance
equity theory and was quickly mimicked in other states. Over the years,
however, equity theory lost steam. For every lawsuit that succeeded, an-
§§ 18A:7A-15, 7A-15.1, 7A-34 to -35, 7A-38 to -40, 7A-42, 7A-44 to -45 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1997). For a description of this process, see Sally B. Pancrazio, State Takeovers and
Other Last Resorts, in SCHOOL BOARDS: CHANGING LOCAL CONTROL 71 (Patricia F. First &
Herbert J. Walberg eds., 1992) (describing the state's takeover of the Jersey City schools).
88 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-6001 (2001).
89 See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (striking down
Florida's use of a minimum competency exam, which was a requirement for a full academic
diploma, due to the lingering legacy of school segregation).
90 But see Paul O'Neill, Special Education and High Stakes Testing for High School
Graduation: An Analysis of Current Law and Policy, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 185, 195-216 (2001).
91 Nevertheless, the National Educational Association still voices some opposition to
testing. Premature Retreat on Testing Threatens Students' Progress, USA TODAY, July 31,
2001, at A14. See also Hagit Elul, Making the Grade, Public Education Reform: The Use of
Standardized Testing to Retain Students and Deny Diplomas, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
495, 536 (1999) (arguing against the use of high-stakes testing).
92 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
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other failed. 93 Even successful litigants often failed to garner their de-
sired levels of increased school spending.94
In addition, equity lawsuits began to lose support from many of the
nation's large, urban school districts. Urban districts lost their appetite
for equity lawsuits even as they continued to struggle mightily with de-
livering basic educational services.95 Many urban districts realized that,
despite the obvious challenges they confront in serving children, gaps in
educational spending between urban and non-urban districts were not the
key problem. Indeed, in most states (New York is a notable exception),
major urban school systems benefit from spending levels that exceed
state averages. 96 As a result, in successful equity-based school finance
lawsuits, urban schools stood to lose or, at best, not gain additional
resources.
97
In 1989, the school finance litigation world changed in a way that
welcomed urban districts back into the fold. Many observers point to a
1989 decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court98 as ushering in the ade-
quacy theory of school finance litigation.99 Unlike the equity theory that
sought to close spending gaps between high- and low-income districts,
adequacy-based lawsuits challenge state school finance systems not be-
93 Compare Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980)
(holding the Wyoming school finance system unconstitutional partly because it failed to pro-
vide substantially equal funding), with Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758 (Md. 1983) (holding Maryland's school finance system constitutional, as neither the state
equal protection clause nor the education clause required equal funding).
94 See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 267-68 (1999);
Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunities, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of School
Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L.
REV. 543, 618-28 (1998); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State
Courts, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1072, 1072 (1991).
95 However, despite conventional wisdom to the contrary, some observers note improve-
ment in some urban schools. See, e.g., GENE BoroMs ET AL., THE 2000 HIGH SCHOOLS THAT
WORK ASSESSMENT: IMPROVING URBAN HIGH SCHOOLS (2000), available at http://www.sreb.
orglprograms/hstw/publications/pubsllmprovingUrbanHS.pdf.
96 See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DISPARITIES IN PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT
SPENDING, 1989-1990, apps. A-E (1995) (illustrating that on an unadjusted per-pupil spending
basis, urban districts outspend their suburban and rural counterparts). For comparisons be-
tween specific city and state means, see NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, STATISTICS IN
BRIEF, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION:
SCHOOL YEAR 1998-99, tbl.5 (Mar. 2001) (1998-99 per-pupil spending data, by state); NAT'L
CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100 LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1989-99, 30 tbl.10 (Sept. 2000)
(1998-99 per-pupil spending data for the nation's 100 largest cities).
97 For a fuller discussion of the urban school dimension, see Michael Heise, State Con-
stitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68
TEMPLE L. REV. 1151, 1172-74 (1995).
98 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
99 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 94, at 268-69 (noting how Rose contributed to the transi-
tion from equity to adequacy theory).
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cause some districts benefit more but because the quality of education in
some districts is inadequate.
As adequacy eclipsed equity theory in the school finance litigation
world, one critical step remained. Specifically, courts were left with the
vexingly difficult task of defining educational "adequacy." Some state
courts balked, effectively deferring to legislative definitions.' °° How-
ever, other courts did not flinch as they leapt into the fray and generated
judicial definitions of educational adequacy.' 10 Many followed the lead
of the Kentucky Supreme Court and construed adequacy in terms of a
constitutional requirement for competency in core academic subjects and
skill sets. 102
It is into this definitional void that litigants in New York and North
Carolina maneuvered their states' standards and assessments programs.
Many in the educational establishment, still smarting from their failure to
forestall systematic efforts to increase their accountability and searching
for ways to increase resources, seized upon a subtle opportunity and
joined educational standards and assessments policies to school finance
litigation. More specifically, equal education is now defined in terms of
educational adequacy. ' 03 And school finance litigants increasingly turn
to standards and assessments results for key evidence supporting their
assertions that schools are constitutionally inadequate. By joining these
disparate movements, litigants seek to transform failure in the classroom
into success in the courtroom and leverage educational standards into
legal entitlements for additional resources.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
The New York and North Carolina cases illustrate five critical is-
sues that would benefit from careful consideration by education policy-
makers and lawmakers.
A. COURTS AS EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKERS
One issue involves the courts' role in educational policymaking.
The courts played an integral role almost fifty years ago in ensuring
equal educational opportunity. 104 Indeed, the courts' influence over
schools and education policy exploded after the Supreme Court's Brown
100 See, e.g., City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (1995) (holding that school
finance lawsuits involve political questions).
101 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208-11.
102 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec'y of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass.
1993) (citing Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 186).
103 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 94, at 266-72.
104 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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v. Board of Education decision in 1954.105 Today, it is difficult to name
a single aspect of school and educational policy not influenced by laws,
regulations, lawyers, and courts. However, a dispassionate assessment of
the historic record of the efficacy of judicial involvement with develop-
ing and implementing educational policy reveals mixed evidence.
1. Special Education
The courts' ability to influence special education statutes and man-
dates provides one source of optimism for those who look to the courts to
develop and implement education policy reform. The nation's historical
record on making good on promises for education services sensitive to
special-needs children was particularly shameful, especially before the
1970s. Until the latter half of the twentieth century, educating children
with disabilities was considered a matter of little public importance. 10 6
Starting from a baseline of little more than abject general neglect of
special-needs schoolchildren and on the heels of the civil rights move-
ment seeking racial equality that gained momentum during the 1960s,
advocates for the disabled began pressing claims of their own. Advo-
cates for students with disabilities established as an initial target public
schools and education, much like the model forged by those seeking ra-
cial justice. Another common theme linking advocates for racial and
special-needs students' equity is the focus on the federal courts.
Pennsylvania's constitution grants its citizens a "thorough and effi-
cient" education. 0 7 However, the state's treatment of special education
children' 018 ranged from inappropriate and inferior special education ser-
vices to exclusion from public schools. To remedy this situation, advo-
cates turned to the courts. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania,10 9 the state was sued for its treatment of spe-
cial education children. As part of a consent decree, Pennsylvania was
required to provide special education students with a "free" and appropri-
ate educational program.110 The basis for the requirement was that since
the state had undertaken to provide free public education to all children,
including Pennsylvania's "exceptional" children, the state could not deny
105 Id.
106 See Anne P. Dupre, Disability and the Public Schools: The Case Against "Inclusion
72 WASH. L. REV. 775, 783 (1997) (citing Philip T.K. Daniel & Karen B. Coriell, Traversing
the Sisyphean Trails of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: An Overview, 18
OHio N.U. L. REV. 571, 571-74 (1992) (discussing the history of special education)).
107 PA. CONST. art. III, § 14.
108 The PARC litigation discussed in the text dealt with children suffering from varying
levels of mental retardation. See Dupre, supra note 106, at 785.
109 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter
PARC].
110 PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1260.
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similar service to children with developmental disabilities. Ill Although
the PARC litigation culminated in a consent decree, the case is generally
considered as the nation's first to articulate the developmentally dis-
abled's "right to education." ' 12
A second leading case, Mills v. Board of Education, 1 3 expanded
upon PARC in part by involving a larger, broader class of plaintiffs.
Whereas the plaintiffs in PARC were developmentally disabled children,
Mills involved all children in the District of Columbia who were ex-
cluded from traditional public education. In Mills, the court concluded
that the District's board of education had violated federal due process
guarantees afforded to special needs children denied public education
services. The court concluded that no child otherwise eligible for public
education could be denied access to a public education unless the District
provided "adequate alternative educational services" and after a "consti-
tutionally adequate prior hearing."' 4
Individually, PARC and Mills carved new and important terrain in
the then-emerging special education field. Together, the lawsuits
spawned an explosion of scholarly attention and similar litigation in
more than thirty states." 15 Complementing the successful litigation was
that the PARC and Mills cases helped spark a demand for legislation.
The two leading legislative responses at the federal level include Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973116 and the Education for All Hand-
icapped Children Act." 7
Section 504 and IDEA (the successor to the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act) perform similar yet distinct tasks. Section
504 advances a broad prohibition against discrimination by public
schools and is pegged to a public school's eligibility for receipt of federal
education funds. 18 That is, public schools may elect to ignore Section
504 requirements but at the cost of forgoing federal education funding.
Although perhaps slightly narrower in scope, IDEA places upon public
schools specific substantive and procedural affirmative duties toward
special-needs children and is far more detailed in what it requires. One
notable policy position embodied within IDEA is a preference for edu-
111 Id. at 1259. I use the term "developmentally disabled" as a substitute for the term
"mentally retarded," the language used by the court in its opinion.
112 MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 692 (4th ed. 2002);
Dupre, supra note 106, at 784.
113 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
114 Id. at 875.
115 YUDOF, supra note 112, at 693.
116 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
117 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-61 (1976) [hereinafter EAHCA]. EAHCA is now part of the Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-91 (1994)) [hereinafter IDEA].
118 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
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cating special needs children in classrooms alongside "children who are
not disabled" to the maximum extent appropriate. 119 Both statutes seek
as a goal to ensure that special needs children receive a "free and appro-
priate education."' 120
To be sure, challenges confronting special education children re-
main. The effort to provide all children, special or otherwise, with robust
and meaningful equal education is by no means complete. Moreover,
serious questions have arisen regarding the fiscal consequences to local
school districts imposed by a federal statutory mandate. 121 Specifically,
local school districts, operating in a world of hard budget constraints,
continue to struggle with distributing scarce resources to meet the needs
of disabled students as well as the legitimate needs of non-disabled stu-
dents who do not benefit from a federal mandate. 122 Finally, disputes
about policies such as inclusion endure. 123 Indeed, the fact that current
disputes dwell on the relative merits of such policies as mainstreaming
and inclusion provides inferential evidence of the degree of progress on
special education policy since the 1970s.
My point is that the special education context supplies at least a
plausible example of how courts have been successfully deployed to as-
sist in bringing about a change in education policy. When Congress en-
acted the Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, in direct
response to the PARC and Mills litigation, Congress found that more than
one million children had been entirely excluded from public schools and
that many other children struggled in school because of unmet special
education needs. 124 Today, more than six million children (about thir-
teen percent of the entire school-age population) receive some form of
special education service.125 Despite lingering disputes, most observers
would agree that the nation has made significant strides in serving the
119 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(B) (1994). For a more detailed discussion, see Dupre, supra
note 106, at 786-77.
120 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (1994).
121 See Dupre, supra note 106, at 777-78.
122 See, e.g., id. (questioning the direct and indirect costs to local school districts for
complying with the federal special education mandate); Note, Special Education, Equal Pro-
tection and Education Finance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a
General Education Student's Fundamental Right to Education?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 633 (1999)
(same).
123 Compare Alan Gartner & Dorothy Kerzner Lipsky, Beyond Special Education: To-
wards a Quality System for All Students, 57 HARV. EDuC. REV. 367, 385-90 (1987) (favoring
mainstreaming and inclusion), with Dupre, supra note 106 (arguing against inclusion).
124 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(4-5)(D) (1994).
125 Terry J. Seligmann, An Idea Schools Can Use: Lessons from Special Education Legis-
lation, 29 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 759, 760 (2001).
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special education population. 126 And the courts played a distinct role in
generating progress.
2. Racial Integration
Far less successful, however, has been the federal courts' multi-dec-
ade effort to integrate public schools. 127 School enrollment patterns and
residential patterns remain tightly linked in this country because the
overwhelming majority of public school students attend neighborhood
schools. Public schools therefore tend to reflect the neighborhoods in
which they are located. Neighborhoods in most metropolitan areas re-
main remarkably segregated by income and by race.128
The numbers tell a startling story. Despite almost fifty years of a
federal judicial effort to integrate public schools, most black and His-
panic students attend urban schools that are predominantly minority. In
1996-97, for example, almost 70% of black students and almost 75% of
Hispanic students attended schools that were between half and entirely
minority. 29 Perhaps even more striking, more than one-third of black
and Hispanic students attended schools that were almost exclusively
(more than 90%) minority. 130 The overwhelming majority of white stu-
dents, in turn, attended schools that were predominantly white; indeed,
the average white student attended a school that was 81.2% white. 13'
A focus on some large, urban districts reveals the intensity of racial
and ethnic segregation in American public schools. In 1995, all of the
students in East St. Louis, Illinois, and Compton, California, were minor-
ity. 132 Almost all - between 93% and 96% - of the students in Wash-
ington, D.C.; Hartford, Connecticut; New Orleans; San Antonio;
Camden, New Jersey; Los Angeles; Oakland; and Atlanta were minori-
ties. 133 In Richmond, Virginia, and Newark, New Jersey, more than 90%
126 See, e.g., Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamin, Special Education: From Legalism to Collabo-
ration, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
208-09 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999) (discussing empirical evidence on positive trends for spe-
cial needs students); Seligmann, supra note 125, at 759 (discussing the positive impact of
IDEA on special-needs students' education).
127 Here I distinguish the Court's successful effort to rid the nation of de jure school
segregation from its less successful effort to integrate public schools or rid the nation of de
facto school segregation.
128 See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
129 GARY ORFIELD & JOHN T. YUN, HARV. UNIV., RESEGREGATION IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS tbl.9, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/groups/civilrights/publications/
resegregation99/resegregation99.html (June 1999).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 16, tbl.11.
132 Craig D. Jerald & Bridget K. Curran, By the Numbers: The Urban Picture, EDUC.
WK., Jan. 8, 1998, at 56.
133 Id.
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of the students were minority. 134 In Chicago, 1996-97 minority enroll-
ment was just less than 90%, while in Detroit in the same year, close to
95% of the students were minorities. 135 In 1998 in New York City,
meanwhile, almost 84% of the more than one million public school stu-
dents were minorities.136
Commentators note that current student enrollment trends in larger
public school systems temper any hope one might glean from school de-
segregation's results. Simply put, it is unlikely that school desegregation
measures will improve by any meaningful degree in the future. 137 If any-
thing, they are likely to worsen. By definition, school integration pro-
grams require a sufficient number of white students. And white students
are becoming increasingly scarce in many public school systems, particu-
larly urban ones, due to demographic reasons as well as "white flight." 138
As a result, an increasingly desegregated public school experience is less
likely for many minority students, including Hispanics.' 39 Again, and
this point bears repeating, these dim prospects for integrated public
school settings exist despite almost fifty years of judicial efforts to the
contrary. Paradoxically, within the elementary and secondary education
sector, private schools - especially inner-city parochial schools - are
far more likely to be diverse in terms of student race and socioeconomic
status. 140
3. Structural Barriers
That courts sometimes struggle in the educational policy setting
should not surprise. Courts are structurally ill-equipped to make the
sometimes delicate policy tradeoffs incident to the school finance enter-
prise. Formal litigation, designed to resolve legal disputes in an adver-
sarial manner, was never meant to serve as a dispassionate, thoughtful,
134 Id.
135 ORFIELD & YUN, supra note 129, at tbl.4.
136 Jerald & Curran, supra note 132, at 56.
137 See, e.g., DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
208 (1995).
138 How and to what degree white flight contributes to the present demographic profile of
American public schools remains the subject of some debate. For a summary, see id. at
174-80.
139 James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2093-96 (2002) (noting the evolving demographic profile of America's public
schools and the particular implications for Hispanic students).
140 See, e.g., Nicole Garnett, The NAACP's Parent Trap, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 30,
1996-Jan. 6, 1997, at 16-17 (reporting that "[m]any of the private and religious schools in
inner-city Milwaukee are more integrated than their public counterparts, some of which are
virtually all black"). See Paul E. Peterson & Jay P. Greene, Race Relations & Central City
Schools: It's Time for an Experiment with Vouchers, BROOKINGS REV., Mar. 22, 1998, at 33
(reporting statistics that show that private schools are typically "less racially isolated than their
public school peers").
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deliberate forum to consider and weigh competing policy and funding
objectives and goals.141 The adversarial setting is a blunt instrument and
ill-suited to generate the political consensus that is often necessary to
carry out policy decisions. This is not to say that the legislative process is
perfect. Clearly, it is not. Rather, the smaller point is that, at least at a
general level, despite their defects, the political processes, legislative
and, to a lesser extent, executive branches remain comparatively better
structured than courts to set and implement general school finance
policy. 142
In this regard, New Jersey's three-decade-long school finance litiga-
tion spectacle provides one vivid example of the difficulties with trans-
lating judicial victories into educational victories, especially where
strong political consensus is lacking. 143 On the one hand, litigants suc-
ceeded in raising New Jersey's per-pupil spending level to among the
nation's highest.144 On the other hand, despite increased spending, stu-
dent achievement levels in New Jersey's urban districts continue to lag
behind national averages. 145 Moreover, in response to the "forced ex-
change" between New Jersey taxpayers and schools, New Jersey voters
in 1990 directed their anger over a tax increase, partly a result of the
court decisions, toward Gov. Jim Florio by denying him a second term in
office. 146
141 Even those who applaud litigation efforts may doubt the efficacy of such litigation in
improving student achievement. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, "Broad Ownership" of the
Public Schools: An Analysis of the "T-Formation" Process Model for Achieving Educational
Adequacy and Its Implications for Contemporary School Reform Efforts, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 343,
347 (1998).
142 For a comprehensive treatment of comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUB-
LIC POLICY (1994).
143 See Abbot v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994). For a discussion of the political his-
tory surrounding New Jersey's school finance litigation, see DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL
TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ch.7 (2001).
144 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, STATISTICS IN BRIEF, supra note 96, at tbl.5.
145 See, e.g., NAT'L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, 1996 MATHEMATICS: STATE RE-
PORT FOR NEW JERSEY (1997), tbl.2-6 (reporting that New Jersey fourth-graders attending cen-
tral city school districts lag the nation in mathematics), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nations
reportcard/pdf/stt1996/97974NJ.pdf; 1994 NAEP Trial State Assessment (1995), tbl.2-2 (re-
porting the same for reading in 1994), available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/stt
1994/s34.pdf. See also REED, supra note 143, at 82-88.
146 See Denise C. Morgan, The New School Finance Litigation: Acknowledging That
Race Discrimination in Public Education Is More Than Just a Tort, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 99, 142
(2001) (asserting that "New Jerseyites vented their anger on their elected officials" in response
to the tax increases needed to respond to the court decisions in the Robinson and Abbott cases).
Morgan notes that "Jim Florio was the first (and still the only) governor in the modern history
of New Jersey to be denied a second term." Id. at 142 n.214. See also David Kocieniewski,
Florio's Style, Like Tax Rise, Remains Issue in Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2000, at A1
(noting that even after ten years, Florio's decision to raise taxes necessary to fund the school
finance court decisions remains "the single act that has most defined his career"); REED, supra
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The school finance area in particular is fraught with peril for many.
The overwhelming majority of judges (and their clerks) are not trained as
policy analysts and thus possess little expertise in school finance minu-
tiae. School finance litigation frequently forces judges into unfamiliar
technical and policy terrain. For example, in the most recent chapter of
the decade-long DeRolph litigation, the Ohio Supreme Court all but ad-
mitted that its understanding of the state's complicated school funding
formula in a recent decision was flawed. 147
Judges' struggles with the asserted relation between educational
spending and student achievement also inform. Despite decades of atten-
tion, scholars continue to explore the precise relation between educa-
tional resources and achievement. Complicated debates continue to
smolder in the academic literature. 148 Despite significant social scien-
tific uncertainty surrounding the nature and contour of the relation be-
tween resources and achievement, many court opinions demonstrate
judges' willingness to assume clarity where none exists, at least among
social scientists. 149
note 143, at 86 (describing the "New Jersey taxpayer revolt of 1990 and the subsequent instal-
lation of a solid Republican majority in the legislature and a Republican governor").
147 The Ohio Supreme Court recently brought to a close the state's decade-long school
finance litigation. In its third decision since the case was docketed in 1995, the court ruled,
entered judgment, and ceded its jurisdiction in the matter. DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184
(Ohio 2001). However, soon afterward, the Ohio Supreme Court again engaged in the matter,
referring lingering disputes to a master commissioner. DeRolph v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1113
(Ohio 2001). It is widely agreed that the basis of the lingering disputes pivots on flaws in the
Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of the state's complex school funding formula. See, e.g., The
Court Punts Again, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 21, 2001, at 16A.
148 See Position Statement, supra note 85, at 24; Hauser, supra note 85, at 27; Mehrens,
supra note 85. For articles generally skeptical of a correlation between educational spending
and educational opportunity, see also Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential Expendi-
tures on School Performance, 18 EDUC. RESEARCHER 45 (1989); Eric A. Hanushek, Throwing
Money at Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19 (1981); ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE
0. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 277-81 (1992); Eric A. Hanushek, When
School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 423 (1991); Eric
A. Hanushek, Money Might Matter Somewhere: A Response to Hedges, Laine, and Green-
wald, 23 Eouc. RESEARCHER 5 (1994); ERIC A. HANUSHEK, supra note 49; Clayton P. Gillette,
Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1185, 1213-16 (1996). For articles
generally supportive of a correlation between expenditures and educational opportunity, see
also Larry V. Hedges et al., Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of Studies of the Effects of
Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, 23 EDUC. RESEARCHER 5 (1994); Ronald F.
Ferguson, Paying for Public Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 293 (1991); Christopher F. Edley Jr., Lawyers and Education Reform, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 457 (1991).
149 See Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and Controversies About the Effectiveness of
School Resources, EcON. POL'Y REV., Mar. 1998, at 11, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/
rmaghome/econ pol/398ehan.pdf; ERIC A. HANUSHEK, Do HIGHER SALARIES BUY BETTER
TEACHERS?, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
W7082. Compare Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 140 (Ala. 1993) ("there is a posi-
tive correlation between spending on education and student performance in this state"), with
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Another worrisome aspect of courts' involvement in education poli-
cymaking is their seeming inability to disengage from judicial supervi-
sion once begun. The nation's experience with school desegregation
aptly illustrates this point. Although almost fifty years have passed since
the Brown decision, federal courts remain embroiled in many desegrega-
tion plans.150 As litigants continue to squabble about what it means for a
school district to be "unitary" or "fully integrated," the direct and indirect
costs associated with school desegregation plans mount. Analogous bat-
tles over school finance issues promise to become just as contentious and
prolonged.
B. CHILLING EDUCATIONAL POLICY
Even if courts were suitably structured or judges well-trained or
both, such judicial activity would nonetheless likely chill educational
policymaking. The policymaking chill flows largely from the economic
consequences triggered by legal judgments resulting from successful
school finance lawsuits. When educational policymakers assess the costs
and benefits of possible standards and assessments policies, the prospect
that a policy initiative could enhance the prospects (and possible success)
of a school finance lawsuit must now enter into the equation. The poten-
tial financial consequences of the lawsuits in New York and North Caro-
lina to policymakers (and taxpayers) illustrates why a new variable must
be included into cost-benefit analyses of education policies, at least stan-
dards and assessments policies.
When New York policymakers adopted the Regents Learning Stan-
dards and related exams in 1996 after more than a decade of develop-
ment and debate, 151 it is safe to assume, they did not do so in an effort to
increase the state's legal exposure to school finance litigation. However,
as previously discussed, results from Regents Exams were used success-
fully by school finance litigants suing the state at the trial court, though
not at the appellate court. 152 Whether the state will be ordered by a court
to reform its school funding scheme in a manner that addresses the chal-
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 61 (R.I. 1995) ("money alone may never be
sufficient to bring about 'learner outcomes' in all students").
150 Unfortunately, data describing the extent of the nation's current engagement are
scarce. In 1990, the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights reported that 256
school districts, with a total combined student enrollment exceeding two million, operated
under court supervision in school desegregation cases brought by the Justice Department. See
David S. Tatel, Desegregation Versus School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, 4 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 61, 63 n.20 (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC., 1990 ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY: COURT-ORDERED SCHOOL DISTRICTS
(1990)).
151 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
152 See supra Subpart I.A.
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lenges confronting New York City's public schools is not yet clear. Fis-
cal data hint at the magnitude of the issue that remains in litigation.
The amount of money at stake is significant, even by New York
standards. According to the U.S. Department of Education, New York
state spent $26.9 billion in 1989-99 on its public elementary and secon-
dary schools. 153 In fiscal 1997, $3.7 billion (42.5%) of New York City's
$8.7 billion total revenue for its public elementary and secondary stu-
dents came from the state.154
While no firm consensus exists on how much more funding New
York City schools needs to achieve constitutional adequacy, estimates
include an additional $1 billion or more per year.155 An additional $1
billion per year to New York City schools would amount to an immedi-
ate 11% boost to New York City's annual education revenue stream and
3.7% of the state's entire K-12 public education budget. Thus, from
either an absolute or relative vantage point, the fiscal implications of the
litigation are vast. If this estimate is even close to accurate and if the
trial court decision is reinstated, what it means is that New York re-
sidents might need to generate an additional $1 billion of new education
spending, redistribute existing state funds, or devise some combination
of both.
Such significant financial consequences surely influence education
policymakers as well as policy. To assume otherwise is to blink at real-
ity. Policymakers contemplating developing and implementing standards
and assessments must now ask themselves whether the real (or per-
ceived) benefits to student performance and school accountability war-
rant the increase in legal exposure to successful school finance
judgments that can fuel significant budgetary pressure. Rational assess-
ments of otherwise desirable policies could plausibly change if the effec-
tive cost of such a policy reaches the levels suggested by recent school
finance decisions in New York and North Carolina.
To be sure, whatever the ultimate cost of the Campaign for Fiscal
Equity decision in New York, it will not likely dislodge New York
policymakers from their reliance on the state's Regents Learning Stan-
dards and exams. After all, New York's standards and assessments have
153 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FOR PUBLIC ELE-
MENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, supra note 96, at 9 tbl.3.
154 NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 100 LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECON-
DARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS, supra note 96, at 28 b.10. Also, preliminary budget figures for
fiscal year 2003 paint a similar picture. According to the New York comptroller, New York
City schools are projected to receive $12.7 billion in fiscal 2003. Of this amount, 44% (ap-
proximately $5.6 billion) will come from the state. See H. CARL MCCALL, STATUS REPORT:
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION (April 2002).
155 See Abby Goodnough, State Asks Court to Overturn School Financing Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at D3.
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trenched deeply into that state's education fabric. Consequently, any
policy chilling in New York flowing from the court decision will likely
be indirect and long-term. However, more direct policy chilling is possi-
ble in states that have not yet progressed as far as New York and North
Carolina on the standards and assessments front. After all, unlike New
York and North Carolina, other states benefit from seeing the possibili-
ties ex ante and are in a better position to adjust policy decisions in antic-
ipation of possible litigation.
C. DEFLECTING ATTENTION AND RESPONSIBILITY
School finance litigation that leverages student standards and as-
sessments deflects attention away from students, schools, and parents
and toward school funding formulas, lawyers, and judges. The nagging
gap between what citizens seek and what children (and schools) deliver
in terms of academic achievement justifiably worries many people. 156
Indeed, concerns about the quality of education in this country are
neither ill-founded nor lacking in empirical support. Evidence of
problems with our educational system is well chronicled. 157 Many edu-
cational achievement indicators, viewed from a variety of vantage points,
fuel increasingly somber assessments of the condition of American edu-
cation. 158 Despite what many people - particularly parents - might
want to believe, many well-intentioned efforts designed to reform educa-
tion, partly by increasing student achievement, have largely failed to
achieve their goals.159 A mournful consensus has formed around two
general observations: (1) American students' academic performance re-
mains unsatisfactory and increasingly poor in comparison with many of
the students' foreign counterparts, and (2) these trends have not im-
proved over time despite numerous reform efforts.' 60
Although fingers continue to point at an array of potential sources
of liability, eyes focus upon schools and, more specifically, their re-
sources. To be sure, there is plenty of blame to go around for the disap-
pointment, and it may well prove that school funding formulas contribute
to some degree. That said, it is assuredly not the case that school finance
156 See generally RAVITCH, supra note 78 (describing the constant drive for education
reform that flows, in part, from unease with student achievement).
157 See supra Part II. For one summary, see generally NATION AT RISK, supra note 49.
See also PETER W. COOKSON JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF AMERi-
CAN EDUCATION 4 (1994) (describing an "educational malaise" affecting American education).
158 See, e.g., Chester E. Finn Jr., Introduction to EDUCATION REFORM IN THE '90S xi
(Chester E. Finn Jr. & Theodore Rebarber eds., 1992); Sam Peltzman, The Political Economy
of the Decline of American Public Education, 36 J.L. & ECON. 331, 331 (1993); Lewis D.
Solomon, supra note 49, at 886-87 (1993).
159 See, e.g., Finn, supra note 158, at xi.
160 Peltzman, supra note 158, at 331.
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and funding formulas are the sole cause of something as complex as un-
derwhelming school and student performance.
Although most acknowledge the problems in American education
and the need for increased accountability,' 6' responsibility for the
problems has proven difficult to establish. School finance litigation and
the involvement of judges and courts buffer elected officials and
lawmakers from responsibility for improving schools. Of course, there is
no shortage of public officials who resent litigants' seeming "end-run"
around the political process to the courtroom. By deploying standards
and assessments in a manner that recasts school finance questions as le-
gal questions, litigants seek to extract from courts and judges what they
cannot get from legislators and governors. It is easy to understand
lawmakers' angst. After all, successful school finance lawsuits threaten
to cost state governments dearly and further erode lawmakers' discretion
over education policymaking and budgets. Many governors and
lawmakers are displeased to find that a school finance court decision has
blown a multi-million-dollar (or more) hole in a state's carefully crafted,
long-negotiated budget.
To be sure, some lawmakers might paradoxically welcome the judi-
cial intrusion and seize upon a chance to point to judges and courts as the
reasons for increased taxes necessary to comply with school finance de-
cisions. Thus, some lawmakers - especially those who believe that
schools merit more funding but are wary of a potential anti-tax backlash
- relish judges taking the political heat, even at the cost of ceding some
legislative authority. However, such a consequence raises the twin spec-
ters of an increasingly politicized judiciary and an increasingly legalized
legislature. Both results place additional stress on traditional notions of
separation of powers and the proper structure of government.
D. THE ADAPTABILITY OF VESTED INTERESTS
The deployment of the standards and assessments movement into
school finance adequacy litigation illustrates how organized interest
groups vested in the status quo can nimbly adapt to and maneuver within
an ever-changing educational policy milieu. It also illustrates how liti-
gants can successfully deploy policies and laws in a manner that gener-
ates unexpected results. The carcasses of past reform endeavors co-
opted by various interest groups litter the education policy landscape. 162
Such a landscape is a testament to organized interest groups' acute abil-
161 See supra Subpart II.B. See also Hanushek & Raymond, supra note I, at 365 (dis-
cussing the increasing salience of accountability in education reform).
162 For one general history of education as well as efforts at education reform, see RA-
vITcH, supra note 78.
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ity to transform well-meaning reforms into vehicles for little more than
additional resources and control.
In seeking to understand the educational establishment's evolving
posture toward standards and assessments, institutional self-interest and
incentive structures explain a lot. Given the potential exposure, the edu-
cational establishment's initial resistance to the development and imple-
mentation of standards and assessments was predictable. Less so was its
ability to see how standards and assessments might be used in a manner
to enhance a lawsuit's prospect for extracting additional funding. Bolder
still is how it seeks to transform classroom failure into courtroom success
and additional taxpayer dollars. Education is a highly labor-intensive ac-
tivity, and, as a result, labor costs consume a substantial portion of
school district budgets. 163 Thus, victories in court for increased educa-
tional spending invariably inure to the benefit of the educational estab-
lishment, especially school administrators and teacher unions.
E. WHY THESE CONSEQUENCES WILL NOT Go AWAY ANYTIME SOON
The specter of merging standards and assessments and school fi-
nance litigation has arrived.l 64 Many states have developed and imple-
mented various standards and assessments programs. Recent lawsuits in
New York and North Carolina illustrate how such a merger can be ac-
complished.1 65 Despite structural problems flowing from retrofitting
policy challenges into lawsuits, the litigation in New York and North
Carolina provides one blueprint for future litigants.
Those seeking more funding for schools struggling to deliver ac-
ceptable educational services find judges far more receptive than
lawmakers to their claims. Reflexive pleas to lawmakers for increased
resources are beginning to wear thin on legislators and governors attuned
to a constituency anxious to see some reliable, clear returns on their in-
vestment. Taxpayer revolts flare up with increasing regularity across the
country. Big-city school districts such as New York and Chicago do not
163 In 1998-99, instruction costs - which are largely, though not exclusively, labor-
driven - accounted for more than 61% of current expenditures and 52% of total U.S. public
elementary and secondary school spending. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, supra note 69, at tbl.162 (national data on total expenditures for
public elementary and secondary schools, by function). According to the American Federation
of Teachers, one of the nation's leading teacher unions, using slightly different data, the per-
centage of education expenditures devoted exclusively to teachers nationwide in 1998-99 was
38%. See AM FED'N OF TEACHERS, DEP'T OF RESEARCH (1999) tbl.I-8, available at http://aft.
org/research/survey99/tables/tablel-8.html.
164 For one prediction of this trend, see Heise, supra note 46, at 60-61 (describing the
potential interaction between school standards and assessments and school finance litigation).
165 Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), rev'd,
744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 2000 WL
1639686 (N.C. Super. Oct. 12, 2000).
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dare try to increase educational spending through appeals to the ballot
box. Instead, they must turn to the more expensive capital markets. In
such a political environment, it is understandable why those seeking ad-
ditional resources for public schools are eager to stay clear of legislatures
and the political processes and instead to embrace courts and lawsuits.
Courts provide an alternative to increasingly skeptical lawmakers and a
more demanding political "marketplace."
CONCLUSION
Despite notable successes, those committed to a judicial strategy for
educational policy change should recall a history replete with profound
resistance by numerous actors and institutions to judicial intrusions into
core educational policymaking. Just as the education establishment has
demonstrated, once again, its instincts for self-preservation and further
entrenchment within an ever-changing policy environment, competing
institutions are capable of similar adaptability.
The taxpayer revolt in California, partly prompted by that state su-
preme court's school finance decision, illustrates how resistance to court
decisions can severely blunt the efficacy of a judicial strategy.1 66 The
California tax revolt reveals problems that arise when property tax-pay-
ing citizens - principally middle- and upper-income families largely
satisfied with their educational situations - confront overly ambitious
judicial activity seeking to influence school funding policy. 167 Before
the successful school finance lawsuit, per-pupil spending in California
was among the nation's highest. After the Serrano decision, per-pupil
spending in California fell to among the nation's lowest. A judicial strat-
egy that cleverly seeks to leverage educational standards and assessments
to bolster school finance lawsuits presents its own set of risks.
Of course, even when political consensus to help schools further
exists, adequate resources must also exist. Now that national defense
and fighting terrorism have displaced (however temporarily) education
reform as leading governmental priorities and economic growth has stag-
nated, how schools might fare in the annual competition for shrinking
state budgets is anyone's guess. 168
166 Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
167 See, e.g., Fabio Silva & Jon Sonstelie, Did Serrano Cause a Decline in School Spend-
ing?, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 199 (1995); William A. Fischel, Did Serrano Cause Proposition 13?,
42 NAT'L TAX J. 465 (1989). But see ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE:
How STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 86-108 (2000) (challenging the
thesis that Serrano caused Proposition 13).
168 At this point it is no doubt futile even to estimate the magnitude of the direct and
indirect costs to New York state flowing from the attack of September 11, 2001. Obviously,
the total cost will be nothing short of extraordinary. Equally clear is that the impact on New
York's economy is severe. The severity was illustrated by Gov. George Pataki's request for an
2002] COURTS, EDUCATION, AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 663
By deflecting attention about student achievement gaps - exposed
in part as a result of successful standards and assessments reforms -
away from students and toward school resources, those defending the
status quo seek to leverage one reform effort to fuel another. To the
extent these battles find a home in the nation's courts, they promise to be
contentious and protracted. Although a healthy portion of these debates
remains in legislative and executive areas, a steady migration to the
courts is under way. If history is any guide, once school finance policy
disputes entrench in the courts, they will remain in the judiciary for de-
cades to come. Citizens, educators, and lawmakers will find it difficult
to regain control over school finance issues and their important policy
consequences.
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